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Patent Remedies and Practical Reason
Thomas F. Cotter*
Carl Sagan once described the earth as “a routine planet near a
humdrum star stuck away in an obscure corner of an unexceptional galaxy
which is just one of a hundred billion galaxies in the universe.”1 Not long
ago, one may fairly have described the law of patent remedies in similar
terms: an obscure corner of the legal universe, of deep and abiding interest to
a small number of enthusiasts but largely ignored by everyone else. Today,
by contrast, the law of patent remedies finds itself, like some implausibly
successful American Idol contestant, thrust into unexpected prominence. As
Professor John Golden notes in his article Principles for Patent Remedies,2
patent remedies are now the subject of Supreme Court case law,
congressional and agency hearings, op-ed pieces, and even cocktail party
banter.3 Much of the interest centers on the ability, real or perceived, of
patent owners to threaten the shutdown of products and services the public
depends on or to extract billion-dollar judgments for the infringement of
relatively minor inventions.4 Policy prescriptions from all sides of the debate
have come fast and furious,5 while the law itself continues to evolve in
sometimes unexpected ways. Golden’s article casts much light on the
contours of this debate, helpfully pointing out how little we know about
certain fundamental aspects of our patent system (including the value of

*

Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. CONVERSATIONS WITH CARL SAGAN 82 (Tom Head ed., 2006).
2. John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 505 (2010).
3. Id. at 506–08. I’m joking about the cocktail party banter.
4. Id. at 506.
5. Id. at 507.
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patent remedies);6 how desired policy goals are likely to conflict and thus be
frustrated;7 and how, despite Golden’s lack of confidence in ever crafting
some ideal system of patent remedies, adherence to his five recommended
principles might lead to a more rational, better functioning system.8 I will
argue below that Golden’s analysis (much of which I find persuasive) is
grounded in what I and others have referred to elsewhere as “practical
reason”9—roughly speaking, the practice of making rational decisions in
light of uncertainty. To the extent that I find fault in Golden’s analysis, it
resides in what I interpret to be his occasional despair at having to settle for
practical reason over some platonically-ideal alternative, and to my
occasional disagreements with his application of practical reason to the
problems at hand.
To begin, as Golden correctly points out, most patent scholars adhere
to an instrumental view of patent law (patent law as a means to an end), and
there is general consensus that the ends include invention, disclosure, and
innovation (meaning generally the commercialization of an inventive
principle, as distinct from invention itself).10 There is less consensus as to
other possible goals, however, such as “prospecting,” enabling follow-on
innovation, facilitating transactions, and signaling value;11 and, whether
intended or not, patent law surely has an impact along yet other dimensions
as well. Scholars have noted, for example, the potential for expansive patent
rights to affect the norms of science and the role of research universities in
generating knowledge,12 while others have argued (albeit controversially)
that patent doctrine sometimes contributes to ongoing racial and gender
disparities.13 Whether patent law succeeds, therefore, in purely utilitarian
terms, depends upon (1) the criteria one chooses for measuring social
welfare, (2) which goals (or consequences) one believes are important, (3)
patent law’s comparative advantage, if any, in relation to other alternatives
for effecting those goals, and (4) patent law’s comparative cost in relation to
6. See id. at 508, 527–51 (illustrating how the interacting parts of the patent system as well as
certain fundamental difficulties make optimization of patent remedies problematic).
7. Id. at 528–29.
8. See id. at 551–91 (offering three principles for the adaptive development of patent
remedies—nonabsolutism, antidiscrimination, and learning—and two principles for
implementation—administrability and devolution).
9. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
10. See Golden, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 509–11.
11. Id. at 520–21.
12. See generally, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
13. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual
Property Policy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 416 (2008) (contending that the validation of racial
categories in patents may arguably validate racist or racialist social practices); Shlomit YaniskyRavid, Rethinking Subject Matter Eligibility: A Social and Gender Perspective, Presentation at “The
Future of Subject Matter Eligibility After In Re Bilski,” Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel, Jan.
4, 2010.
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those alternatives. Absent robust theoretical and empirical consensus on
these points, patent law’s efficacy as a means to an end is elusive; worse yet,
pursuing any one goal may frustrate another of equal or greater importance.14
In short, even if everyone agrees at an abstract level that the goal of
the patent system is to promote social welfare by stimulating invention and
disclosure, devising an optimal patent system (or even an optimal part of the
system, such as an optimal system of remedies) to carry out this policy
remains a daunting task indeed. Golden nevertheless argues that the law of
patent remedies would be improved if courts and other policy makers paid
heed to his five principles: (1) nonabsolutism (courts should be cautious
about adopting rigid, per se rules); (2) antidiscrimination (courts should not
favor one business model, for example that of manufacturing patentees, over
another); (3) learning (where possible, rules should induce the production of
useful information); (4) administrability; and (5) devolution (where possible,
the law should leave decisions to the decision makers who are closest to the
relevant facts).15 Applying these principles, Golden argues, among other
things, that courts should not bar nonmanufacturing patent owners from
obtaining injunctive relief or lost profit damages;16 that damages law should
allocate burdens of production on various issues to the parties with superior
information;17 and that a narrow prior-user exemption could help shed light
on “patents’ usefulness as stimuli to technological progress.”18
As I suggested above, Golden’s five principles embody what I have
referred to in other work as practical reason, defined as “a method that
emphasizes the need for choice, deliberation, and communication in the face
of radical uncertainty . . . a way of simultaneously affirming and mediating

14. Golden, supra note 2, at 527. An illustration from an aspect of the law of remedies that
Golden doesn’t touch on in his paper is the recent liberalization of the standard for initiating
declaratory judgment actions to challenge patent validity. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (stating that a patent licensee is “not required . . . to break or terminate its
. . . license . . . before seeking a declaratory judgment . . . that the . . . patent [was] invalid,
unenforceable, or not infringed”); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380
& n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (interpreting MedImmune as rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable
apprehension of suit test”). While this change may have the desirable effect of reducing the social
costs attributable to invalid or unenforceable patents, it also could inhibit some socially beneficial
patent licensing. These negative effects could, in theory, be compounded by cases such as Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), which (according to some readings) restricts
the ability of patentees to pursue as patent infringement the breach of certain licensing conditions.
See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Ky. 2009)
(concluding that breach of a restriction on sale can amount to both breach of contract and patent
infringement, but that breach of a restriction on postsale use can amount to, at most, a breach of
contract). The interdependence of various patent doctrines, in other words, means that changing
one or more doctrines piecemeal may have unforeseeable consequences for the system as a whole.
15. Golden, supra note 2, at 553–69.
16. See id. at 534–35, 557 (stressing that the antidiscrimination principle would, at the least,
require legal rules favoring manufacturing patent owners to have substantial justification).
17. Id. at 585.
18. Id. at 588.
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among our conflicting norms.”19 Indeterminate (even banal) as the concept
of practical reason may sometimes seem, I have argued that practical reason
is inevitable insofar as “[j]udges and other policymakers necessarily make
decisions under conditions of great uncertainty, before all of the evidence
that otherwise might have some bearing on the decision can be assembled.”20
To put it concisely, to live in the hope of attaining some absolute truth
derived from unshakable first principles is a fool’s game; the rules we devise
to resolve our disputes and to structure our lives are necessarily constrained
by the limitations of our knowledge, the contingency and contestability of
our goals, and the need to revise and rebuild in light of new experience.
Although Golden does not use the term practical reason to
characterize his five principles, my understanding of how courts and other
policymakers would apply them suggests that the principles are indeed
grounded in a form of practical reason. According to Golden, the “primary
role” of his principles “is to provide a deliberative framework for reasoned
decision making that is attentive to the public interest”;21 and he notes that
while the “metaprinciple” of utilitarianism “can provide a background value
system that can inform ultimate judgments about how to resolve conflicts
between the principles . . . it presumptively cannot provide a broadly
incontestable, determinate answer.”22 Various other facets of his analysis
resonate with the nondogmatic focus of practical reason as a tool for making
rational judgments under conditions of uncertainty: his suspicion that
absolute rules may be premised on a greater certainty than is warranted by
the facts;23 his attention to the institutional constraints under which courts
operate;24 and his emphasis on crafting legal standards that can better harness
the parties’ comparative informational advantages.25 Much of this is
congenial with my own approach to patent remedies,26 which is rooted in the

19. Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 30
(1997) [hereinafter Cotter, Pragmatism]. In this work and an earlier one, Thomas F. Cotter, Legal
Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2086–91 (1996)
[hereinafter Cotter, Legal Pragmatism], I discuss the evolution of the concept of practical reason
from Aristotle to the American pragmatists and beyond, and its application in the writings of
contemporary scholars such as Richard Bernstein, Richard Posner, and Daniel Farber.
20. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 19, at 2090.
21. Golden, supra note 2, at 513.
22. Id. at 571.
23. See id. at 553–55 (explaining the fundamental uncertainty underlying the kinds of awards
patent law should provide).
24. See id. at 563–64 (using the field of antitrust law to illustrate concerns about courts’
abilities to identify socially problematic behavior and implement corrective steps that improve
market performance).
25. See id. at 561–63, 564–69 (proposing that a regime of patent remedies should encourage
parties to produce information that will improve the regime while also leaving important decisions
and responsibilities to parties with better knowledge).
26. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (2005); Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup,
Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151 (2009).
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practical-reason tradition. My (relatively limited) critique of Golden
therefore centers on two subsidiary matters: first, the extent to which Golden
sometimes seems to betray a Platonic longing for something more
determinate than practical reason to guide his analysis; and second, my
disagreement with Golden’s application of practical reason to a few specific
issues within the field of patent remedies.
As for the first point, early in the paper Golden explains, persuasively,
why it is impossible to craft a body of remedies law that would optimally
carry out the (many and sometimes conflicting) goals of the patent system.27
Golden therefore asks us to assume a “patent czar” who attempts to create a
system of remedies while accepting “other aspects of the law as fixed.”28
Even on this assumption, however, which Golden characterizes as
“draconian,”29 Golden believes that the enterprise is plagued by
“fundamental difficulties,”30 and he laments the inevitable “disconnect
between a patentee’s reward, the social value of the invention, and the
fraction of realized social value that the patentee appropriates.”31 Elsewhere
he writes that “whether a patent holder chooses to license patent rights at all
will likely depend on a circumstance that might have little to do with the
invention’s intrinsic value,” namely whether the patentee “can produce or
otherwise directly employ the patented invention at greater profit than
others”;32 and that, “under a pure damages regime, a judicial system that
looks to the market to assess patent value might find itself looking in a
mirror” insofar as negotiated damages reflect the damages the parties believe
a court would award in the event of litigation.33 Golden’s five principles,
therefore, may help guide us to a more rational and better functioning system
than the one that currently exists, but Golden’s description of the disconnect
between “intrinsic” value and reasonable royalties, between patent awards
and patent policy, leads one to suspect that Golden nevertheless feels a bit
melancholy about the whole endeavor. If only we could somehow perceive
the forms and not just the shadows cast on the cave wall!
By contrast, I reject the notion that patents have any intrinsic value.
As I (and others) have long argued, from an economic standpoint, a patented
invention is only “worth” whatever profit or cost savings it enables over the
next-best alternative.34 The value of a patent is therefore always relational
and dependent on a myriad of contingent events: what other technologies are
available, how well they work and at what cost, what sort of marketable

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Golden, supra note 2, at 527.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 508 & n.15.
E.g., Cotter, supra note 26, at 1183 & n.157.
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products or services might benefit from the use of the patented invention, and
so on. Indeed, the contingency of the value of an invention is one of the
more attractive reasons for having a patent system in the first place. Rather
than have the government or private patrons determine in advance what
needs to be invented and how much to pay for it, the patent system confers
exclusive rights upon inventors and then lets the market decide what the
value of that invention is in light of other alternatives. Whether this system
succeeds in maximizing social benefits (however one defines them) over
social costs (however one defines them) is, to be sure, a matter of debate. Be
that as it may, however, inventions are not fundamentally different from
many other tangible and intangible things insofar as their value resides in
what they enable one to do; and what they enable one to do may vary
considerably from one time and place to another.
Similarly, I see nothing “draconian” in basing the law of patent
remedies (at least that portion of the law that addresses compensatory
damages) on the assumption that other features of the patent system be taken
as fixed. I have argued before that both rule-of-law and institutional
competency considerations suggest that, in fashioning remedies for past
conduct, courts should preserve (but not enhance) the incentive scheme
embodied in the substantive law, even if that incentive scheme is flawed.35
For all we know, for example, the congressionally mandated patent term may
be too long or too short to induce the optimal amount of invention (or
disclosure, or whatever); similarly, the judicially created standards relating to
nonobviousness may screen out too many or too few inventions from the
patent system. Regardless of whether one perceives these or other aspects of
the patent system to be flawed, however, the role of the courts in awarding
damages (as I see it) is simply to replicate the balance (right or wrong) that
the substantive law strikes and to avoid the temptation to manipulate
damages awards to correct for perceived deficiencies in substance. (To the
extent there are such deficiencies, of course, they should be addressed headon as matters for substantive reform.) Once we accept this principle, I have
argued, a logical framework for awarding retrospective damages falls neatly
into place: both to preserve the patent incentive and to discourage
infringement, the presumptive standard for awarding damages should be the
greater of the patentee’s lost profits or the royalty the parties would have
agreed to ex ante.36 Thus, in a case in which, but for the infringement, the
patentee would have excluded the defendant from using the patented

35. Id. at 1159.
36. Id. at 1176; see also BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 26, at 61. In cases in which the cost of
detecting and enforcing one’s rights would exceed the value of a purely compensatory award,
enhanced damages of some sort may be necessary to preserve incentives and deter infringement.
Cotter, supra note 26, at 1177. At the same time, courts should be wary of awards that too readily
depart from the presumptive standard referred to above, because such awards risk creating perverse
incentives either to infringe (if awards generally are too low) or, on the part of patentees, to lie in
wait rather than engage in good-faith ex ante licensing negotiations (if awards are too high). Id.
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invention, the correct measure of damages is the patentee’s lost profit.37
Alternatively, when the facts suggest that the patentee would have negotiated
a license ex ante with the infringer, then the correct measure of damages is
the royalties the patentee would have earned but for the infringement, based
on the hypothetical willing licensor–willing licensee framework.38 To be
sure, the implementation of these rules is often quite difficult (as discussed
below); and it’s surely possible that following these rules risks reducing,
rather than enhancing, social welfare if (for example) the system already
grants too many patents on minor inventions.39 In crafting damages rules,
however, one has to start somewhere, and the assumption that remedies
should be ancillary to substance seems more defensible than any other
alternative. Draconian, it is not.
With respect to prospective relief, on the other hand, the principle that
courts should take the substantive law as a given is, I concede, less helpful
because by itself the principle doesn’t indicate whether courts should prefer
injunctions to prospective damages or vice versa. In this context, then, courts
must exercise some judgment concerning how best to promote sound patent
policy, and Golden is right to note how uncertain this undertaking can be.40
In this context, then, one may be justified in lamenting the need to settle for
practical reason over some ideal, but nonexistent, methodology that
optimally aligns private and public benefits. As guides for attaining some
rational compromise among competing policies, nevertheless, Golden’s five
principles have much to recommend them. Even so, I take issue with a few
of his specific applications of practical reason with regard to both prospective
and compensatory remedies.
As for prospective relief, I tend to agree with Golden41 that a
rebuttable presumption in favor of granting permanent injunctive relief to the
prevailing patentee might be preferable to the standard the Supreme Court
adopted in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.42 As other scholars have
37. Cotter, supra note 26, at 1176.
38. Id. at 1176; BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 26, at 229–31.

39

Of course, if the invention is minor so too should the damages be, assuming the damages
reflect the value of the patent in relation to the next-best alternative.
40. Golden, supra note 2, at 563–64.
41. Id. at 578–79.
42. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). In eBay, the Supreme Court held that the prevailing patentee was not
automatically entitled to a permanent injunction, absent exceptional circumstances, but rather that
courts should apply “traditional equitable principles.” Id. at 391–93. The four factors “a plaintiff
must demonstrate” are
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.
Id. at 391. I have argued elsewhere that injunctive relief should still be the norm except when the
public-interest factor is substantial (for example, when a patent would block access to essential
medicines) or when factors indicative of “patent holdup” (e.g., the patent reads on a small
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noted, the “traditional” factors the Court trumpeted in eBay bear at best a
tenuous relation to “tradition,”43 and thus (if anything) may have made it
harder to obtain injunctive relief in patent cases than in other areas of the
law. Nevertheless, I think Golden is wrong to argue (as I think he is arguing)
that manufacturing and nonmanufacturing patentees should stand on the
same footing when it comes to awarding injunctive relief.44 All other things
being equal, a manufacturing patentee is more likely to benefit from the
defendant’s exclusion from the marketplace than is a nonmanufacturing
patentee, who (in most cases, most likely) is happy to license its patent to
others. With respect to nonmanufacturing patentees, then, the decision
whether to award injunctive relief boils down to the prudential question of
whether an injunction—which will lead to ex post negotiations over terms of
use and thus may overcompensate if the appropriate baseline is the ex ante,
pre-lock-in value of a license—is preferable to having a court imperfectly
estimate the value of a prospective license for the technology at issue.45
Determining the appropriate tradeoff presents a genuinely difficult issue.46
As for manufacturing patentees, by contrast, injunctive relief seems
appropriate (again, all other things being equal) precisely because the
plaintiff’s business model is more likely to depend on exclusion rather than
licensing. In this sense, a different emphasis does not amount to favoring
one business model over another, but rather of recognizing that one model
depends on injunctive relief to succeed, whereas the other does not
necessarily so depend.47
component of a larger end product, the infringement was inadvertent, and the ex post value of the
patent greatly exceeds its ex ante value) are present. Cotter, supra note 26, at 1174–82 & 181 n.146.
43. See DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES,
AND CONTEMPT 85–90 (2010) (noting eBay’s conflation of the standards for preliminary and
permanent injunctions); Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV.
LITIG. 161, 168 & n.13 (2007) (criticizing eBay for referring to “a ‘familiar’ four-part test that the
Court had never before applied”). A literal reading of the opinion would appear to radically modify
the traditional standard by requiring the plaintiff to prevail on all four of the Court’s factors (rather
than according the burden on some of those factors to the defendant and engaging in an overall
balancing). In one recent Federal Circuit decision, however, the court states the applicable rule as if
it intends to take the Supreme Court at its word. See i4i Ltd. P’ship. v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d
1246, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that “not all patentees will be able to show injury, and even
those who do must still satisfy the other three factors”).
44. See Golden, supra note 2, at 556–60 (urging a nondiscriminatory approach to patent policy
that will give new approaches to the development and use of technology the chance to show their
worth).
45. There is also the possibility of downward bias, as Golden (citing Elhauge) notes. Golden,
supra note 2, at 568.
46. For what it’s worth, I am inclined to think that the appropriate baseline is the ex ante, rather
than ex post, value of a license, and thus I perceive the risk that injunctive relief will unduly
enhance the value of the patent as substantial. At the same time, however, I have reservations about
the courts’ institutional competence to craft prospective royalties that accurately capture patent
value. For me, the optimal tradeoff would be, as a general rule, to award injunctions except when
the probability of patent holdup is substantial. See Cotter, supra note 26, at 1182–83.
47

See also Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 636 & n.49 (2010) (arguing that
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Golden’s application of practical reason also falls short, in my
opinion, in his discussion of the work of Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro.
Over the course of several pages, Golden discusses the Lemley & Shapiro
argument that the proper “benchmark” for royalties is βθv, where “v”
represents the value of the patent in relation to the next-best alternative; and
β and θ symbolize, respectively, a measure of patentee bargaining power and
the probability that the patent is valid and infringed, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and 0 ≤
θ ≤ 1.48 Golden questions (1) whether v is the correct measure of patent
value, insofar as it limits the patentee’s award to “the marginal value actually
realized by the infringer”;49 (2) whether v can be measured at all, especially
when the product entails multiple components;50 and (3) whether β is a
proper factor in the analysis.51 I think that much of Golden’s analysis here
misses the mark, for several reasons. First, as I have argued before, while the
debate over whether βθv is the proper benchmark (or whether some
alternative, for example θv or just v, is preferable) is interesting as a
theoretical matter, its practical significance is somewhat less clear. For good
reasons, courts do not consider β or θ in calculating reasonable royalty
damages,52 and I do not understand Lemley & Shapiro to be arguing that they
should. As I perceive it, the principal purpose of the debate over benchmarks
is instead to explore whether the availability of injunctive relief ex post is
likely to inflate the value of negotiated royalties substantially beyond the
appropriate benchmark, whatever it is. The practical payoff of the debate, in
other words, is not so much to come up with a method for calculating
damages, but rather to assist in deciding whether injunctions should be
distinguishing between practicing and nonpracticing entities for purposes of calculating
damages does not amount to discrimination against the latter).
48. Golden, supra note 2, at 532–37; see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup
and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1991, 1992–94 (2007) (discussing the intertwined
problems of injunctive threats and royalty stacking, and proposing a method for calculating
reasonable royalties); Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to
Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008) (critiquing Lemley
and Shapiro’s analysis regarding optimal benchmarks, holdup models, and the effect of royalty
stacking); John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 2111 (2007)
(criticizing Lemley and Shapiro for their supposed demonstration of systematic overcompensation
to certain patent holders and for their advocacy of a rule that would presume injunctive relief for
competing patent holders but not for noncompeting patent holders).
49. Golden, supra note 2, at 535. Golden seems comfortable with the fact that an award of v
will not allow the patentee to recover all of the social value of the invention, id. at 533–34, but he
argues that it risks undercompensating the licensor patentee who “could have chosen its licensees or
licensing terms in a way that shaped the course of commercialization more to its benefit.” Id. at
535.
50. Id. at 535–36.
51. See id. at 536–37 (commenting on how β is the “most problematic aspect” of the formula
and has received extensive criticism from scholars).
52. See Cotter, supra note 26, at 1182–83 & n.154 (noting that the value of β may be too
speculative a matter for courts to consider in setting damages based on the willing licensor–willing
licensee framework); id. at 1183 n.156 (explaining that inclusion of a θ factor in calculating
damages ex post would introduce a double-discounting problem).
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marginally more or less common than they were prior to eBay.53 Second, the
difficulty of calculating v is well-known among those of us who argue that,
as a theoretical matter, v is in general a proper measure of the value of the
patented invention.54 As a result, courts and potential licensors or licensees
often look to other measures of patent value (for example, comparable
licenses);55 but I would argue that, from an economic standpoint, these other
measures in effect are proxies for v. The absence of close proxies sometimes
makes the calculation imprecise, but as in other areas of the law one does
one’s best with the available material.56 Third, I think that Golden’s analysis
of why the Lemley and Shapiro analysis threatens to undercompensate
licensing patentees by awarding them only v57 rests on something of a
misunderstanding of Lemley and Shapiro’s point. As I noted above, as a
general matter the nonmanufacturing patentee’s interest lies not in excluding
others from the market, but rather in licensing others to use the patent. In the
case of the nonmanufacturing patentee, therefore, the appropriate measure of
damages is normally lost royalties, not lost profits derived from lost sales.58
In calculating those royalties, the general framework is for courts to try and
reconstruct the deal the willing licensor and willing licensee would have
struck as of the date the infringement began.59 It’s not so clear to me, then,
that v equals the value the infringer actually derived from the use of the
invention; in theory, it should be the expected value of the use as of the date

53. See id. at 1172–73. To the extent one sides with Lemley and Shapiro, in other words, one
might deny injunctive relief in a larger number of cases.
54. See id. at 1183–87 (surveying various approaches for calculating the value of patented
technologies). To be sure, Lemley and Shapiro also argue that the standards courts sometimes use
to calculate reasonable royalties lead to awards that are excessive in light of their proposed
benchmark; but much of their analysis here focuses on the inappropriate use of the entire market
value of the end product as the royalty baseline. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 48, at 2023–24
(arguing that courts misapply a royalty standard for patented components based on the market value
of the entire product if the value of the product as a whole was not dependent on the infringed-upon
component). Unless I overlooked it, the issue of determining the appropriate royalty base is one
that Golden does not discuss in his paper.
55. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“The second Georgia–Pacific factor . . . examines whether the licenses relied on by the patentee in
proving damages are sufficiently comparable to the hypothetical license at issue in suit.”).
56. See Cotter, supra note 26, at 1186–87 (contrasting the costs of using certain methods of
valuing patented technology with the alternative of using “rougher” proxies of value). Golden does
note my argument in favor of deferring to the sort of heuristics the parties themselves would
employ. Golden, supra note 2, at 584 n.437.
57. Golden, supra note 2, at 534–35, 557 n.290.
58. See supra text accompanying note 38; see also Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits
from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 669 (2009) (“Lost profits damages
compensate patent owners who would have had partial or complete market exclusivity in the
absence of infringement. . . . By contrast, reasonable royalty damages are designed to mimic the
result that patentees not interested in or able to take advantage of market exclusivity would have
achieved if they had been able to bargain with the infringers beforehand.”); Durie & Lemley, supra
note 47, at 636 & n.49 (similar).
59. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324.

2009]

Response

135

infringement began. More importantly, though, in a case in which the
patentee would have excluded the infringer (either because the patentee
wanted to use the invention itself, or because it wanted to grant an exclusive
license to someone else, as in Golden’s hypothetical60) there is nothing I am
aware of in the Lemley and Shapiro analysis that would prevent a court from
awarding the patentee its provable lost profits or lost licensing revenues from
having been forced to forgo that exclusive license with someone else.61
Lemley’s other work suggests to me that he would find nothing exceptional
in according the patentee but-for compensation for the proven loss of an
exclusive licensing opportunity.62
At the end of the day, then, I expect that Golden’s five principles
could prove useful in guiding courts and other policymakers on questions
such as whether to grant injunctive relief or prospective damages; how to
calculate royalties when no clear evidence exists as to the value of v; and
whether to consider more expansive prior-use rights. Perfection may be
unattainable, but improvements surely can be made to the functioning of the
current system. Though I disagree with some of Golden’s own applications
of his principles, the thrust of his five principles is consistent with many of
the recommendations I have made over the years. As patent remedies
continue to emerge from obscurity to, if not center stage, at least a prominent
supporting role in the legal system, policymakers would do well to consider
Golden’s exercise in practical reason.

60. See Golden, supra note 2, at 535 (offering an example by which a patent holder chooses
who its licensees will be in order to benefit more commercially).
61. Lemley and Shapiro state that their analysis is “limited to situations in which the patent
holder’s predominant commercial interest in bringing a patent infringement case is to obtain
licensing revenues,” and that their “policy recommendations . . . pertain only to this type of
situation, where the patent holder can claim reasonable royalties but not lost profits.” Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 48, at 2036. I read this as stating a general tendency among the cases—
licensees generally do not seek to exclude and therefore generally do not qualify to recover lost
profits, but rather only reasonable royalties—and not a hard and fast rule.
62. Lemley clearly does contemplate the exclusive licensor’s ability to recover lost profits in
appropriate cases. See Lemley, supra note 58, at 673 (“In my view, a patentee who has granted an
exclusive license should stand in the shoes of the exclusive licensee; if the exclusive licensee has
lost profits because of infringement, those losses should be compensable in a suit by either or both
parties, divided as per the agreement between them.”). See also BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 26, at
248 (noting, and tentatively approving, the rule that a nonmanufacturing patentee may recover lost
profits where the infringement deprived the patentee of profits on the sale of a good that embodied
an alternative technology to the technology embodied in the patent).

